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Outline
INTRODUCTION
SECURITY AGENCIES
MURDEROUS OSTRACISM WILL REPLACE COERCION TO ENFORCE LAW
 Admission to Streets Will Be a Private Choice
 Basic Essentials May Be Denied to Suspects
 Suspects Can Be Stripped of Protection
THE STATE BECOMES A STATE OF MIND
A BILL OF RIGHTS WILL  HAVE NO EFFECT IN A FREE NATION
 No Freedom of Speech
 No Right to Trial by Jury
 No Right to Remain Silent
 No Presumption of Innocence Until Proven Guilty
 No Right To Be Informed of the Charges Against You
 No Equality Before the Law
NEW MOUNTAINS RISE UPON THE HORIZON
 Some "Equality Before the Law" Does Exist
 The Rock of Reality Anchors Free Nation Law
 The Economics Which Take People to Court
 The Power in Precident Shrinks As the Power in Contract Grows
 Law Expressed Through Gradiations of Permissions
CONCLUSION
 

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In this paper I use a metaphor of travel. I will try to bring you along as I tell of my journey from the landscape of law in America to a radically different landscape, law in a free nation. At the start of our journey, where we were raised, the legal landscape is shaped by features such as those enshrined in the Bill of Rights. These are huge mountains which shape our feeling of where we fit and which make us feel comfortable and safe. But these are institutions of state.

If you would journey with me your desire must be strong enough to enable you to turn your back on those comforts which our ancestors in law have assumed for hundreds of years. We must travel away from those mountains, trusting that we will find a legal landscape with better prominent institutions, with a different sort of mountains which will confine human behavior to safe limits, with valleys in which our individualistic human spirits can build happy homes.

Somewhere in the middle of this journey there is a gate, at the frontier between the two nations. Now most of the travel that we must take consists of one long trek to arrive at the gate and then another long trek after passing through the gate. Passing through takes only a few steps. But I mention the gate as a symbol of transition. Any traveler who passes through shows a strong desire to find a new legal homeland.

Our trip must take place in our imaginations, because none of us have ever been in a free nation. I wish I had more snapshots and citations with which I could convince you that those better mountains and valleys exist. Fortunately I can point out some evidence in our shared experience. But each of you, in your individual journeys, might come to barriers which you cannot pass because you are not convinced.

So perhaps you will have something to teach me. Much of what I present here is more of a question than a statement. I have traveled frequently into the free nation which I imagine. It seems plausible to me. But I may be deceiving myself. So take this journey as a suggestion. I ask, could this be true?

You are probably aware that we libertarians differ on whether the state needs to perform law enforcement. I sympathize with those who insist that the state must perform this function, because my picture of anarchistic law still fails to comfort me completely. But I sympathize with anarchists too. While pursuing my libertarian journey I have formed a habit: I mistrust arguments that the state must fill some human need because markets could not possibly be trusted to fill the need. This habit causes me to mistrust the minarchist arguments that the state must provide law. As such the drift of my arguments in this paper will go toward voluntary and away from state institutions, because I have the impression that minarchists have not yet considered the whole picture.

But, if opportunity comes knocking, please do not think that I would insist upon voluntary law. If I am offered a take-it-or-leave-it chance to get a 90% reduction in the role of the state, I will take it before I will spend time arguing about the remaining 10%. But, until opportunity comes knocking, I think it serves FNF’s purpose to promote discussion over the whole range of libertarian possibilities. We are nowhere near consensus. I believe it will help if we listen to each other.

 
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Before we start out on our journey, let me tell about one feature of the landscape where we are bound. Protection of many things dear to you, such as your life, property, and safety, will be provided by private organizations for which we need to invent a name, because there is nothing like these organizations in America. I will call them "security agencies." These will combine a number of functions that we in America get from separate entities such as: insurance companies, police forces, courts, regulatory bureaucracies, and parents.

For an example, you might sign up with a security agency to protect your home from fire, burglary, and natural disaster. As with an insurance company in America, the security agency would promise to restore your property (or the value of it) in the event of loss. But the similarity ends there. The security agency would do much more, because it would be free of the regulations which cripple entrepreneurship in America.

It might provide armed policing for your property. Or it could give you a discount if you and your neighbors were armed and capable of policing your own neighborhood.

Like a fire marshal in America, it would surely want to know about your smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, exits, and practices of storing flammable materials. And, if you want to qualify for the lowest rates, it would probably ask you to submit to whatever inspections it deemed necessary. Like a government building inspector in America, it would provide strong incentives to use materials and practices which enhance safety in new construction.

Thus we see that wise practices, which in America might be required by the state or recommended by parents, will be encouraged by the price structure of security in a free nation. We will be talking more about security agencies as we get closer to the free nation. But, with this taste of what is to come, let’s go.

 
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Early on, in one of my first journeys toward the free nation, I picked up some new ideas: that there would be competition among courts; and that two contesting parties would agree upon which court to use.

Now I had a little trouble with that, because I could not imagine at first why someone who was obviously guilty of a crime would ever agree upon any court. If courts are voluntary, how could wrongdoers possibly be brought to justice?

Well, it must be I wanted to pass through the gate into the free nation. Because eventually I succeeded in convincing myself that institutions could exist which would impel wrongdoers into court. In a nutshell: I believe that ostracism could induce lawful behavior, because in a free nation ostracism would have much more force than it has in America. To try to hammer this point home I’ve decided to call it not just "ostracism" but "murderous ostracism." I have described the institutions of murderous ostracism a number of times here in Formulations. But let me review the highlights again.

 
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Admission to Streets Will Be a Private Choice

First, notice that the state in America, by giving itself monopolies in both providing streets and policing streets, has established an environment in which someone who is known to intend murder can travel virtually unchallenged through the streets up to the door of their intended victim. The state generally does not restrain the travel of anyone unless that person is presently imprisoned by the state.

As I think of it, there is something unnatural and bizarre in the grid of streets and thoroughfares, public spaces, which connect almost every private property in America with almost every other private property, and which can be used by all comers, generally without charge or certification. Please do not misunderstand me. I find this convenient. I enjoy benefits which appear free. But I believe this fundamental feature of the American landscape differs in profound ways from the network of private streets and thoroughfares which would come to exist in a free nation.

For a comparison, consider the access to telephone lines in America. The owners of these privately owned lines generally do not admit any user unless that user’s ability to pay has been established. Naturally the owners of any business want to know at least this much about each of their customers. And sometimes the owners reasonably demand to know more.

To develop an example, start with the observation that most people want to feel safe in their homes. I believe many (or most) street-operating companies would compete for customers by advertising safe neighborhoods, and by making some effort to exclude known or suspected muggers and burglars. The most efficient solution for the street-operating companies may be to join forces with security agencies, offering insurance for customers in the event of a loss, and policing as much as prudent to minimize total expenditures.

So notice that one consequence of private property in streets and thoroughfares is that no one is guaranteed admission to any given street. A private owner may decide to admit only those whose trade offers sufficient promise of profitability. Any traveler who is suspected of being dangerous may be required to pay more for admission or to post bond before entering. And I would not be surprised if street-operating companies found it in their interest to form a league, in which they each reduced their policing costs by mutually denying service to travelers against whom charges had been filed (but not yet answered) by a credible authority.

So in a free nation, as I am building the picture, wrongdoers could find themselves confined to their own property, unable to travel anywhere—except perhaps to the courthouse—until the charges against them have been satisfied. And this radical difference in the legal landscape of the free nation will come about—not because someone has designed the ideal system of law—but as a consequence of free markets in the provision of streets and security.

 
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Basic Essentials May Be Denied to Suspects

To take the next step down our path, to see how much more power ostracism would have in a free nation than in America, notice that in America the state controls who may purchase most essential goods and services. The state regulates or owns vital utilities such as electricity, water, telephone, and sewer, and determines who must be granted service and who may be denied service. Generally, everyone who pays the basic price must be granted service, including dangerous psychopaths. But this would not be true in a free nation. In a free nation business owners may decide for private reasons to deny service to a customer, or to place extra constraints upon the provision of service.

Here again notice that market forces, when freed of regulation by the state, will tend to place more shackles upon criminals. Suppose that the provider of some service, such as local delivery of water, wanting the benefits of pooled policing and insurance, approaches a security agency to negotiate a policy. Now the security agency faces real market forces, one of which is that at times, in order to fulfill its contracts with its customers, it must spend a lot of money trying to bring to justice some person who has been accused of a crime. The security agency will naturally search for ways to reduce this sort of expenditure. One of the obvious tools at its disposal is to negotiate with its other customers the insertion of clauses such as this: "In order to qualify for Reduced Rate B, the insured promises to discontinue all trading with any persons who have outstanding charges against them, as posted by the Consolidated Arbitrators Association." So, I expect market forces to pressure the owners of utility companies to ostracize suspected criminals.

There is another way in which the state in America cripples the power of ostracism. The state runs the system of courts. Since these courts answer to political forces rather than to market forces, they become agents in the attempt to eliminate unfair discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or anything else. As a consequence many business owners dare not exercise private discretion. Although the business owners might have locally available information which would cause them to shun certain customers or to require more security from some customers than from others, they may fail to employ this information because a court might punish them if the court supposes that they discriminated for the wrong reason. Known criminals, vagabonds, and cheats, hold this threat against honorable business owners. But in a free nation business owners would be free to exercise their own discretion. And customers who wanted the best terms of trade would experience incentives to build and maintain good reputations.

So, with a little imagination, we can see that in a free nation someone charged with a serious crime by a well-respected authority may be denied all benefits of trade until she brings herself to account. Through risk-sharing-and-reducing contracts, which I expect truly free markets to produce in profusion, she may be denied food, water, telephone, toilet, banking services, employment, and passage on roads. But no one, you understand, is forcing her to go to court. If she goes, that will be her choice.

 
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Suspects Can Be Stripped of Protection

And finally, if my picture of free-nation ostracism does not yet appear to deserve the label of "murderous," consider this. We know from accounts of earlier systems of law that a person may be declared "outlaw" by his support group. This occurred when a group, which under normal circumstances would come to the defense of any of its members who came under attack, decided that one of its members had violated the rules of the group to such an extent that the group would no longer defend that member. That individual, thus expelled, was outside the protection of the law and, as the accounts are told, may have been murdered by anyone with impunity.

I believe similar institutions would evolve in a modern free nation. Each security agency, knowing that it might find itself insuring the person or property of a person who is accused by another security agency of committing a crime, and desiring to minimize its costs by entering the best possible contracts with its customers, would be motivated to offer discounts to those customers who would agree to present themselves voluntarily to answer charges from a credible authority. And I expect that almost all customers who regard themselves as law-abiding citizens would routinely accept these terms and take the discounts.

Thus I think it would come to pass that most citizens in a free nation would face the threat of losing their first line of defense: they could become outlaws, and could become vulnerable to violent retribution from anyone whom they might have offended. When ostracism takes this form we can call it "murderous."

Having thus convinced myself that wrongdoers could be expected to come to court voluntarily in a free nation, I felt confident that this vital aspect of the legal landscape beyond the gate would be safe. So I continued my journey.

 
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As I traveled hopefully I came to believe that voluntary institutions could perform better than state institutions on issue after issue. So I was compelled to ask how it was that I, and all my neighbors in America, had ever come to have so much blind faith in the institutions of the state.

I observe that the state seems to grow gradually upon the minds of its subjects. To illustrate, consider four stages.

Thus speculating, on the whole process of journey toward the free nation, I passed through the gate at the frontier. Now finding myself among the first features of the legal landscape of a free nation, I continued making discoveries which seem likely to surprise the people back in the land of my birth.

 
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No Freedom of Speech

In this new landscape, with the state almost forgotten, I notice the lack of a power, vested in a government agency, to protect my freedom of speech. And I notice that no one spends their wind proclaiming that individuals have a right to free speech.

Back in America I had noticed that people could not always speak freely, in spite of that land’s purported freedom of speech. A man could not say anything at all to his wife without having to face some consequences. And anyone who went into the showroom of a Ford dealership and tried to give speeches about the virtues of Chevrolets could expect to encounter resistance. So freedom of speech did not apply everywhere. The "freedom of speech" in America was in fact only a notion that the state could not regulate speech.

In the free nation, private property owners will be within their rights to restrict the speech of any visitors within their property. And since I believe almost everything will be private, there will be nowhere in a free nation where an individual can enjoy freedom of speech except within his own property. And even there he must watch his tongue if he hopes to keep his friends. Hopefully you now see that freedom of speech, as cherished by Americans, applies to public spaces (as I have defined "public space" in previous articles, as being delimited more by choices than by property lines) but not to private spaces.

This freedom is important in America because the state controls so much public space in America. If you start with the assumption that there are vast public spaces, and if you note that the state has the power (and the only power) to police in public spaces, then you have reason to fear abuse of this power. The holders of political power could crush transmission of a truth which they found inconvenient. Freedom of speech is a bulwark needed against this potential abuse.

But the state’s declaration of a right to free speech, in any spaces which have been seized by the state, shrinks in importance as the amount of space controlled by the state shrinks. In the extreme, in a totally private nation, a state-declared right to free speech will be meaningless. And further, assuming the private space can remain private, a state-declared right to free speech will be useless.

This line of thinking converged with another line of thinking, about the way that the state grows. When statists call for a new act of state, to address some problem that they perceive, often it seems to me that the problem about which they are concerned has been created or aggravated by something that the state has done before. So I often concur that a problem does indeed exist. But rather than join the statists in calling for a new act of state, I prefer to point out the prior act of state which has created the problem, and to call for repeal of that prior act.

Now, in that framework, notice that a Bill of Rights is an act of state. It is a proclamation by the state, about what the state vows to do or not do. And I tend to interpret calls for a Bill of Rights the way I interpret calls for other acts of state. Yes, there is a problem that needs to be addressed: The state can become overbearing. I agree that something needs to be done about this. But rather than concur in the call for a new act of state, a Bill of Rights, I incline to find the prior act of state that has caused this problem in the first place, and to call for repeal of that prior act.

Let us consider what this means, in terms of its effect upon some other familiar mountains in the legal landscape of America.

 
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No Right to Trial by Jury

We libertarians often cite with favor clauses in contracts which stipulate that arbitration, of a certain sort or by a particular arbitrator, will be used in the event of a dispute. So, in the free nation, freely contracting parties may make arrangements which include no juries.

In a historical context, in nations where the state has taken over law, it makes sense to desire the protection of trial by jury, because this offers some defense against an overbearing state. Back in America the state—and only the state—can prosecute criminal cases. But, on this side of the gate, where the administration of law is in private hands, the need for trial by jury is less. Indeed, I think trial by jury will be a rarity in the free nation, because few litigants will be willing to pay for it. In the free nation, trial by jury will not be free, as it appears in America. The expense of all legal proceedings will fall upon the litigants, their security agencies, and their collaborators.

 
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No Right to Remain Silent

This right also seems reasonable—but only in a nation where the state runs the law. I believe it will vanish, for the most part, in a system of voluntary law.

In the free nation I expect some security agencies will offer discounts to customers who promise to provide all information requested by an arbiter, should a dispute arise. And I expect that most people, wanting the discount and not planning in any case to profit from deception, will sign such a contract. Thus most people will find themselves contracted to supply information which may prove them guilty of some offense. And in the free nation there will be no state to intervene, to break this contract, to protect one of the parties from being expected to testify against himself.

Now of course a person could always chose to lie to the arbiter, or refuse to give information in spite of having contracted to do so. But then he may face all the consequences of ostracism which can be murderous.

If a person did not want to sign a contract with a security agency in which he promised to testify against himself, he might find a contract without this provision. But probably, assuming prices in free markets reflect costs, the person would have to pay a premium for this sort of protection.

 
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No Presumption of Innocence Until Proven Guilty

Markets in a free nation will respond to probabilities. Just as the price of the stock of an oil company rises as the perceived probability that the company will strike new oil rises, the prices paid by a customer for various permissions and protections in a free nation will rise as perceived probability that the customer is a crook rises.

For example, the free market in street services will start to encumber the travels of a suspected child molester long before any court proclaims a verdict of guilty. But if you think this is wrong, and if you operate a street company, you will be free to admit, without any added security, a suspect whom most reasonable people believe to be guilty. Good luck with your other customers, and with your security-insurance premiums.

Thus we see that, in the free nation, market forces will respond to the reputations of traders. Traders who desire the best possible terms will face positive obligations to maintain the best possible reputations.

 
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No Right To Be Informed of the Charges Against You

In a free nation, all contracts will be private and voluntary. Thus any person will be able to decline to do business with any other person. And the declining person will face no requirement to tell why. But of course the declining person may choose to tell, and may be motivated to do so by the hope of shaping a favorable future.

 
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No Equality Before the Law

In the free nation which I am describing here, law will be supplied to the humans who need it through market forces—just as all other needs are filled. And, as with the satisfaction of all other needs, there is no guarantee, and no reason to pretend, that all humans receive equal protections through law.

In America, as I have experienced it, a rich person gets better protection from the system of law than does a poor person. Of course the rich person has to pay more for this better treatment. But equality can be at best a pretense because market forces will find outlets. People with more money will find ways to purchase more of what they desire, in spite of attempts by any state to counteract this tendency.

You may naturally feel a shiver of fear, as you look back in the direction of the legal environment in which you were raised. We can no longer see the mountains which made that place seem safe when we were young. But look ahead.

 
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Some "Equality Before the Law" Does Exist

Lest it seem that I am calling you toward a nation with no moral structure or guidance (a nation completely lacking in what we libertarians would desire), let me point again to the force which I trust to organize civil society. When law is voluntary there is one way, at least, in which everyone, in spite of their wealth, is equal before the law.

Since people who are rich stand higher above the floor of bankruptcy than people who are poor, people who are rich are able to commit more offenses against trading partners, should they set upon such a course, than people who are poor. But such people will probably not be rich for long. As we libertarians understand, people who are rich usually got that way because, and as long as, they serve their trading partners well.

 
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The Rock of Reality Anchors Free Nation Law

Let me review here why the system of law in a free nation should work to the satisfaction of libertarians. The ostracism which drives wrongdoers toward court will be strong only if those wrongdoers have committed what libertarians consider to be a real crime.

We libertarians are not alone in our impulses. Both an overwhelming majority of humans and, which is roughly the same thing, an overwhelming majority of the economically productive forces within humanity, feel a natural revulsion to the acts which libertarians consider to be real crimes. So, given a free market in law, ostracism can be organized effectively to counter these acts. However, for those acts which statists but not libertarians consider to be crimes, a large enough percentage of the population sees no harm in those acts, so effective ostracism cannot be organized against those acts.

 
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The Economics Which Take People to Court

On this side of the gate, since force will not impel litigants into court, both litigants will agree to go to court only in special circumstances. In these circumstances some harsh and uncomfortable reality must propel each litigant to desire resolution of their disagreement. And each litigant must anticipate that his or her circumstances will improve when resolution is reached. So the litigants would agree that they need to reach resolution. But, assuming resolution might be reached in a number of possible ways, the litigants may not yet agree upon which way to conclude their dispute.

We can imagine that there is a pie of benefits which will result from resolution. The litigants, unable to agree how to divide this pie, agree to present their case to a mutually acceptable judge. Since the judge will probably want to be paid, the litigants will do this only when the pie is bigger than the judge’s bill, and when they each expect to get at least a sliver of pie after the judge takes his piece.

 
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The Power in Precedent Shrinks As the Power in Contract Grows

Law in our new home will be simple, not complex. I believe that the law back in America has become complex and incomprehensible to ordinary citizens because the state has given itself a monopoly in law. Even though the lawyers for the two sides are adversaries, and even though the courts appear neutral between the two teams of lawyers, still all three together stand to gain from the aggrandizement and increased complexity of the system. The lawyers for both sides and the courts can grow all together, becoming continuously more costly at the expense of the remainder of society, because the remainder of society cannot detach this three-headed parasite.

But where courts are voluntary no such species of parasite will be able to survive. Since there will be competition among courts, litigants would almost never agree to employ a court which would burden both sides with expensive legal research and maneuvering. Instead the litigants, hoping to divide most of the pie between themselves, will tend to agree upon a court which advertises a simple and comprehensible set of rules.

Precedent is important in American legal tradition only because the state has given itself arbitrary power to overturn contracts. Since the state can arbitrarily overturn contracts between parties, it becomes important to know the circumstances, the precedent, which will help you guess what rules the state will impose upon you. Luckily for lawyers in America, those circumstances are complex and evolving, and the rulings are like asteroids which might fall from the sky upon you.

But in a free nation the basis of law will be contract, not precedent. In the free nation the people who give law enforcement its power, through ostracism, care mostly about their own self-interest. Naturally, they want confidence that their contracts will be honestly enforced. And they can increase their chance of getting this if they support honest enforcement of the contracts of others. Thus the power of ostracism will thrust toward simple enforcement of contract.

Now there will be instances where precedent has power in a free nation. When a judge rules a particular way in a dispute, that ruling will become part of the expectation of all who learn of it. So newly contracting parties who know of that ruling but who do not bother to mention it, in either their negotiations or their contract, implicitly accept the precedent of the ruling.

However, if one of the newly contracting parties thinks the precedent of the ruling would damage her interest, then she can negotiate a clause in the contract which will set a different expectation, should similar circumstances arise. Here we see the limit on the power of precedent. Any issue which is important enough for newly contracting parties to raise during their negotiations will be ruled by their new understanding. The only issues which will fall to the judgment of precedent will be those which were not recognized as being worthy of attention at the outset.

In a sense precedent will have a large scope, in that it will include all the assumptions made but not explicitly negotiated. It will include, for instance, the meanings of all words in the contract except for those few which are explicitly clarified. But since it can be overridden at the whim of newly contracting parties, we see that precedent will serve free enterprise as a cost-saving standard. It will not be an expensive tyrant.

 
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Law Expressed Through Gradations of Permissions

Law, as I picture it, will be expressed as the reluctance of people to trade with others whom they perceive as dangerous, or who have some stigma attached to them. In the extreme this reluctance will be expressed as black-and-white, yes-or-no decisions on the part of all trading partners. It can reach the extent of murderous ostracism.

But, before any boycott reaches that extent, trading partners will surely find smaller ways to express dissatisfaction; trading partners can informally add little costs to an exchange. And, on a larger scale of organization, surely there will be an industry in bonding, which will make it possible for people who have stigmas to obtain additional permissions by making certain concessions or paying added security.

We can trust free markets to make this work properly. For an example, suppose you think this is not working, suppose you know of people who you think are unfairly stigmatized. Then you have just described the niche where you can start a business. If the stigma is wrong, then you can provide fairly-priced bonding to that unfairly stigmatized class, and make money for yourself too.

As one hint of the free market activity which may ensue in the free nation, I notice the aggressive marketing of credit cards in America. Banks make a business of trying to identify people who are good credit risks and of trying to get the business of those people by offering better terms. This example shows us half the picture: that people who are good risks tend to get better deals. Unfortunately the other half of the picture, that people who are bad risks tend to get worse deals, does not have so many illustrations in common experience in America, because there is not a free market in punishments. The state in America, by attempting to give itself a monopoly in administering punishments, has contorted this industry to the extent that we can only imagine what it would be like if free.

 
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I have tried to lead you most of the way into the new legal landscape of a free nation. With some trepidation, we have left behind the mountains (the legal assumptions) in America. But we have tried to believe that our libertarian instincts are true. We have tried to believe that we will find better mountains if we set our course steadfastly to reduce the role of the state.

Back in America we had always believed that those familiar mountains gave us our only protection, from vaguely shaped evils. But we learned that those very mountains had been placed there by our enemy, the state. We learned that the public space created by those mountains, where the state has given itself a monopoly in enforcing law, has caused most of the social ills in America. Because in America markets cannot fill the need for law.

Now we have arrived where we can start to see the shape of our new homeland. Ahead of us the major mountains are in view. They are a different kind of mountain. They look humane. D
 

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Authors whose work has influenced this development:

Terry L. Anderson and Donald R. Leal. Free Market Environmentalism, Pacific Research Institute, 1991.

Bruce L. Benson. The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State, Pacific Research Institute, 1990. And private correspondence.

Walter Block. A speech given at the World Conference of the International Society for Individual Liberty, San Francisco, 1990.

David Friedman. The Machinery of Freedom, Second edition, Open Court, 1989.

Friedrich A. Hayek. Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume I, Rules and Order, University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Philip E. Jacobson. A presentation "Does deception have utility in a positive-sum society?" at a meeting of the Free Accord Unitarian Fellowship, Hillsborough, NC, 1992. And private correspondence.

Bruno Leoni. Freedom and the Law, Expanded Third Edition, Liberty Fund, 1991.

Albert Loan. "Institutional Bases of the Spontaneous Order: Surety and Assurance," Institute for Humane Studies, Humane Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1991/92.

Roderick T. Long, "The Decline and Fall of Private Law in Iceland," Formulations, Vol. I, No. 3, Spring 1994. And other articles in Formulations, and private correspondence.

Morris and Linda Tannehill. The Market for Liberty, 1970, Reprinted in Society without Government, Arno Press, 1972.

Prior articles in Formulations by the author which have developed similar themes:

"The Power of Ostracism," Vol. II, No. 2, Winter 1994-95.

"Might Makes Right: An Observation and a Tool," Vol. III, No. 1, Autumn 1995.

"Toward Voluntary Courts and Enforcement," Vol. III, No. 2, Winter 1995-96.

"Locks in Layers," Vol. III, No. 4, Summer 1996.

"A Theory for Libertarianism" and "Nineteen Propositions About Property," Vol. V, No. 3, Spring 1998.

Richard Hammer, founder of FNF, has worked in the past as an engineer and residential remodeling contractor. Now he spends most of his time writing for, and editing, Formulations.

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